This chapter contains sections titled: Cultural relativism Ethical absolutism A cognitive alternative to EA: ethical relativism External and internal objections to ER Finding the middle ground: pluralistic relativism Ethics in business Conclusion.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ARGUMENT OF 1768 Some ordinary facts about the world we live in can be readily explained by other ordinary facts. One can, for example, explain the fact that when we are facing north the sun rises on the right and ...

In this paper we consider whether one type of individual investor, which we call at risk investors, should be denied access to securities markets to prevent them from suffering serious financial harm. We consider one kind of paternalistic justification for prohibiting at risk investors from participating in securities markets, and argue that it is not successful. We then argue that restricting access to markets is justified in some circumstances to protect the rights of at risk investors. We conclude with some (...) suggestions about how this might be done. (shrink)

Given the ubiquitous nature of love, numerous theories have been proposed to explain its existence. One such theory refers to love as a commitment device, suggesting that romantic love evolved to foster commitment between partners and enhance their reproductive success. In the present study, we investigated this hypothesis using a large-scale sample of 86,310 individual responses collected across 90 countries. If romantic love is universally perceived as a force that fosters commitment between long-term partners, we expected that individuals likely to (...) suffer greater losses from the termination of their relationships—including people of lower socioeconomic status, those with many children, and women—would place a higher value on romantic love compared to people with higher status, those with fewer children, and men. These predictions were supported. Additionally, we observed that individuals from countries with a higher (vs. lower) Human Development Index placed a greater level of importance on romantic love, suggesting that modernization might influence how romantic love is evaluated. On average, participants worldwide were unwilling to commit to a long-term romantic relationship without love, highlighting romantic love’s universal importance. (shrink)

In der modernen Medizin kommt es zunehmend zu Entscheidungskonflikten zwischen Intervention und Interventionsverzicht dort, wo nicht die medizinisch-technischen Möglichkeiten handlungsleitend sein sollen, sondern die am individuellen Patientenwohl sich orientierende bioethische Prognose entsprechend den klassischen arztethischen Prinzipien des primum nil nocere und des salus aegroti suprema lex. Schadensverbot und Heilauftrag sollen nicht heteronom und uniform vorgegeben werden, sondern sich am Willen des Patienten orientieren. Nicht selten macht jedoch die Ermittlung des mutmaßlichen Patientenwillens große Schwierigkeiten, vor allem bei Demenz, Koma, schwerem Trauma (...) und Multimorbidität in der Nähe des Todes. Vorsorgliche Betreuungsvollmachten und Behandlungsverfügungen, fälschlich oft 'Patiententestament' genannt, sind als Instrumente für stellvertretende Entscheidungen und zur Ermittlung des Patientenwohles in solchen Situationen vorgeschlagen worden. Der Beitrag analysiert die entscheidungstheoretischen, ethischen, rechtlichen und medizinischen Aspekte prospektiver Entscheidung über eine medizinische Behandlung in einem transkulturellen und interdisziplinären Vergleich von Entscheidungen und Diskussionen in den USA, Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Es werden verschiedene Modelle und Betreuungsverfügungen mit unterschiedlicher rechtlicher und medizinischer Validität und Präzision sowie unterschiedlicher kultureller und individueller Akzeptanz entwickelt und diskutiert. (shrink)

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better if we were immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Life, Death, and Meaning brings together key readings, primarily by English-speaking philosophers, on such 'big questions.'.

For more than 50 years the Guy's Hospital physician Frederick Pavy attempted to discredit the theory of his erstwhile teacher, Claude Bernard, that liver glycogen was broken down to supply sugar to the systemic circulation. His opposition was driven by his clinical perceptions and was based on two assumptions: the first was that the kidney was a simple filter through which small molecules would diffuse, so that sugar had to be prevented from reaching the systemic circulation. For Pavy, the (...) liver was the barrier. The second was teleological: he could not believe that nature would operate in what he saw as a defective way, i.e. converting sugar into glycogen and then back again. At the beginning of his long working life Pavy regarded himself as a physiologist and was critical of the stagnancy of English physiology which was kept afloat by amateurs like himself in whatever time they could spare from busy private practice. At the end he came to see his own view of carbohydrate metabolism as symbolic of the schism between responsible clinicians and irresponsible daydreaming physiologists. (shrink)

The Executive Council pro tem of the HSA, organized during a business session of the Wofford Symposium at Spartanburg, S. C. last November, met et Vanderbilt University the following March and drafted a constitution for the Society. The members of this Council were Darrel E. Christensen of Wofford College, Robert L. Perkins of the University of South Alabama, Frederick G. Weiss, George L. Kline, Warren E. Steinkraus, Donald P. Verene, and Otho M. Adkins. Shortly thereafter the constitution was (...) adopted and an election was held. Professors Christensen, Steinkraus, Perkins, and Verene were elected President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer of the Society. * * * PURPOSE * * * The purpose of the HSA, as specified by Article II of the constitution, is "to promote the study of the philosophy of Hegel, its place within the history of thought, its relation to social, political, and cultural movements since his time, and its relevance to contemporary issues and fields of knowledge. In addition to the study of the thought and significance of Hegel, the Society has as its purpose the furtherance of original philosophical thought which has its basis in the philosophy of Hegel or which treats issues in the style, manner, or method of Hegel.". (shrink)

What is the opposite of freedom? In _Freedom as Marronage_, Neil Roberts answers this question with definitive force: slavery, and from there he unveils powerful new insights on the human condition as it has been understood between these poles. Crucial to his investigation is the concept of marronage—a form of slave escape that was an important aspect of Caribbean and Latin American slave systems. Examining this overlooked phenomenon—one of action from slavery and toward freedom—he deepens our understanding of freedom itself (...) and the origin of our political ideals. Roberts examines the liminal and transitional space of slave escape in order to develop a theory of freedom as marronage, which contends that freedom is fundamentally located within this space—that it is a form of perpetual flight. He engages a stunning variety of writers, including Hannah Arendt, W. E. B. Du Bois, Angela Davis, Frederick Douglass, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and the Rastafari, among others, to develop a compelling lens through which to interpret the quandaries of slavery, freedom, and politics that still confront us today. The result is a sophisticated, interdisciplinary work that unsettles the ways we think about freedom by always casting it in the light of its critical opposite. (shrink)

Bracket out the wrong of committing a wrong, or conspiring or colluding or conniving with others in their committing one. Suppose you have done none of those things, and you find yourself merely benefiting from a wrong committed wholly by someone else. What, if anything, is wrong with that? What, if any, duties follow from it? If straightforward restitution were possible — if you could just ‘give back’ what you received as a result of the wrongdoing to its rightful owner (...) — then matters are morally more straightforward. But in real-world cases that is often impossible, and questions of ‘how much, from whom and to whom?’ become far more vexing. The beneficiary disgorging all benefits of the wrong is part of the story, but where that is not possible or will not suffice to compensate the victim of wrongdoing we discuss various ways of allocating the cost of making the victim whole, including supplementation from public coffers. (shrink)

Complicity consists in one person contributing to someone else's wrongdoing. But there is a diverse cluster ways of being involved in another’s wrongdoing. For a ‘diagnosis by exclusion’, we first fix the meaning of complicity in contrast to that with which it is often wrongly conflated. Literally cooperating in wrongdoing with others, for instance, is more than complicity. Each and every cooperator is actually a co-principal in the wrong jointly committed; and each bears the full responsibility, shared with all co-principals, (...) for the outcomes of that wrongdoing. Other sorts of involvement with wrongs committed by others amount to less than complicity because the involvement there is causally inert and hence does not actually contribute to the other’s wrongdoing at all. Pardoning wrongs wholly in the past may be like that. So too may be some cases of wilfully overlooking wrongs that others commit under one's very nose. Complicity is a very precise way of being involved in wrongdoing. Complicity consists in a secondary contribution of a causal (or potentially causal) sort to a wrong committed by someone else. That ‘contribution factor’ can be graded on many axes, in terms of how proximate, reversible or frequent the contribution was. Other things being equal, one is more complicit the …. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Validity of Anselm's Ontological Argument The Truth of the Anselmian Premises On Whether Anselm's Ontological Argument Begs the Question On Parodies The Validity of the Ontological Argument of Descartes and Leibniz On the Truth of the Descartes–Leibniz Premises Critiques of the Descartes–Leibniz Ontological Argument Ontological Arguments of the Twentieth Century Gödel's Ontological Argument On Whether Gödel's Argument is Sound The Modal Perfection Argument The Temporal‐Contingency Argument Conclusion References Appendix 1. Logic Matters Appendix 2. Formal (...) Proofs of Some Modal Arguments. (shrink)

We demonstrate that social capital is associated with positive food security outcomes, using survey data from 378 households in rural Uganda. We measured food security with the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale. For social capital, we measured cognitive and structural indicators, with principal components analysis used to identify key factors of the concept for logistic regression analysis. Households with bridging and linking social capital, characterized by membership in groups, access to information from external institutions, and observance of norms in groups, (...) tended to be more food secure. Households with cognitive social capital, characterized by observance of generalized norms and mutual trust, were also more food secure than others. However, we established that social capital is, by itself, insufficient. It needs to be complemented with human capital enhancement. We recommend that development interventions which focus on strengthening community associations and networks to enhance food security should support activities which enhance cognitive social capital and human capital skills. Such activities include mutual goal setting, trust building and clear communication among actors. Education efforts for community members, both formal and non-formal, should also be supported such that they potentially strengthen social capital to improve food security in rural Uganda. (shrink)

It is shown by means of general principles and specific examples that, contrary to a long-standing misconception, the modern mathematical physics of compressible fluid dynamics provides a generally consistent and efficient language for describing many seemingly fundamental physical phenomena. It is shown to be appropriate for describing electric and gravitational force fields, the quantized structure of charged elementary particles, the speed of light propagation, relativistic phenomena, the inertia of matter, the expansion of the universe, and the physical nature of time. (...) New avenues and opportunities for fundamental theoretical research are thereby illuminated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant's Critique of Berkeley HENRY E. ALLISON THE CLAIMTHAT KANT'S IDEALISM,or at least certain strands of it, is essentially identical to that of Berkeley has a long and distinguished history. It was first voiced by several of Kant's contemporaries such as Mendelssohn, Herder, Hamann, Pistorius and Eberhard who attacked the alleged subjectivism of the Critique of Pure Reason. 1 This viewpoint found its sharpest contemporary expression in the notorious (...) Garve-Feder review to which Kant responded at length in the Prolegomena. In subsequent times it has been championed by Schopenhauer, and most nineteenth century German commentators on the relation between the two philosophers. 2 In addition, it has been, and continues to be, the prevailing view of the vast majority of British writers on Kant, including, with significant qualifications, Norman Kemp Smith. 3 This tradition continues despite the fact that Kant specifically, and in no uncertain terms, repudiated this identification in the Prolegomena and the second edition of the Critique. In both works he responds to the charges of subjectivism, and in so doing distinguishes his position from that of Berkeley, who in the eighteenth century was commonly regarded as a solipsist and denier of the "external world." 4 In contra-distinction to Kant's own critical or transcendental idealism, which explains the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge within the realm of possible experience, Berkeley is characterized as a "dogmatic" or "visionary idealist." He is judged guilty of "degrading bodies to mere illusion" (B69), of regarding things in space as "merely imaginary entities" (B274), and of holding with all "genuine idealists" that: "all knowledge through the senses and experience is i Cf. Hans Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1892), II, 494-505. Cf. Friederich Fredericks, Der Phainomenale Idealisraus Berkeley's und Kant's (Berlin, 1871); Robert Zimmerman, "Ober Kant's Widerlegung des Idealismus yon Berkeley" (Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, Philox.-hist. Kl.), LXVIII (1871); Gustav Dieckert, tiber dos Verhiiltnis des Berkeleyschen ldealismus zu Kantischen Vernun]tkritik (Konitz, 1888). Tiffs is a consequence of the general British tendency to view Kant in phenomenalist terms. A typical recent example is found in P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966). Kemp Smith in his Commentary to Kant's Critique o[ Pure Reason (2nd ed., rev., 1923) takes greaZ pains to distinguish between the subjectivist strand in Kant's thought, which is essentially identical to Berkeley's position, and the genuine critical doctrine which stands side by side with it in the text. 9 Cf. I-I.M. Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeley's Materialism 1710-1733, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965). [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of pure understanding is there truth" (374). 5 One of the chief reasons for the continuation of the Kant-Berkeley tradition is that these, and similar statements about Berkeley, which we find in these works and in Kant's correspondenc e with Beck, have not been taken very seriously by Kant's critics. They are usually dismissed as obvious misinterpretations, due to Kant's ignorance of Berkeley's actual writings, and of his reliance upon distorted second and third hand accounts of Berkeley's thought such as is to be found in Beattie. Furthermore, this view is often supported by the philological reflection that Kant did not read English, and that Berkeley's writings were not yet available in German translation. 6 The philological argument, however, loses much of its force when we consider that there was indeed a German translation of Berkeley's Dialogues, which although apparently unknown to nineteenth century scholars, was readily accessible to Kant. This is to be found, together with a translation of Collier's Clavis Universalis and critical analyses, in a work by the professor of philosophy at Rostock, Johann Christian Eschenbach, entitled: Samlung der vornehmsten Schri[tsteller die die tFirklichkeit ihres eignen K~rpers und der ganzen Ki~rperwelt leugnen (Rostock, 1756). Furthermore, in addition to this work, which was probably known to Kant, there is Berkeley's important Latin work, De Motu (1721), as well as French translations of many of... (shrink)

Two case studies involving waves of claims and public discourse about mysterious aerial sightings in the United States over half a century apart are presented. Most evaluations of such episodes by scientists ethnocentrically portray sightings of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) as the product of deviance, irrationality, or psychopathology The emphasis on natural science approaches to understanding the social sciences is primarily responsible for the present erroneous pseudoscientific status of UFOs, as is the failure to recognize or take as problematic the (...) notion of rationality as a cultural category. Consequently, the symbolic significance of UFOs has been obscured. Contemporary interpretations of UFOs serve the unconscious resurrection of the power and function of omnipotent beings during a secular age. A semiotic culture‐as‐text social anthropology approach is more fruitful as it does not treat rationality as an objective given, but emphasizes the social construction of reality and the translation of unfamiliar symbol systems. (shrink)

This volume examines the philosophical thought of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and is an assessment of King’s contribution to philosophy—especially ethics, social philosophy and philosophy of religion. It also explores the relevance of King’s thoughts as “liberatory discourse”—insurgent thinking aimed at enabling contemporary social justice.